
























Environmental policy under  
product differentiation  
and asymmetric costs – 
Does Leapfrogging occur and  






September,  2000     Nr.  124 
Institut für    Halle Institute for Economic Research 
Wirtschaftsforschung Halle 





























Jacqueline Rothfels is economic researcher at the Institute for Economic Research 




Dr. Jacqueline Rothfels 
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle 
Abteilung Strukturwandel 
Kleine Maerkerstr. 8  





























Discussion papers are the sole responsibility of the authers. The views expressed do not 
necessarily coincide with the views of the Institute of Economic Research Halle (IWH). 
 
  1 
IWH ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Environmental policy under product differentiation  
and asymmetric costs – 
Does Leapfrogging occur and is it worth it? 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies the influence of environmental policies on environmental quality, 
domestic firms, and welfare. Point of departure is Porter’s hypothesis that unilateral 
environmental regulation may enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms. This 
hypothesis has recently received considerable support in theoretical analyses, especially 
if imperfectly competitive markets with strategic behavior on behalf of the agents are 
taken into account. Our work contributes to this literature by explicitely investigating 
the implications of asymmetric cost structures between a domestic and a foreign firm 
sector. We use a partial-equilibrium model of vertical product differentiation, where the 
consumption of a product causes environmental harm. Allowing for differentiated 
products, the domestic industry can either assume the market leader position or lag 
behind in terms of the environmental quality of the produced product. Assuming as a 
benchmark case that the domestic industry lags behind, we investigate the possibility of 
the government to induce leapfrogging of the domestic firm, i.e. a higher quality 
produced by the domestic firm after regulation than that of the competitor prior to 
regulation.  
It is shown that in the case of a cost advantage for the domestic firm in the production 
process the imposition of a binding minimum quality standard can serve as a tool to 
induce leapfrogging. In case of a cost disadvantage the same result can be achieved 
through an adequate subsidization of quality dependend production costs. Thus, careful 
regulation enables the domestic firm in both scenarios to better its competitive position 
against foreign competitors and to earn larger profits. Additionally, environmental 
quality and welfare can be enhanced.  
 
 
JEL-Classification: Q 2, L 1 




This paper investigates the impact of environmental policies on environmental quality, 
domestic firms, and welfare. Usually the goal of environmental policies is to protect the 
environment by imposing restrictions on firms and/or consumers. These policies are 
often critizised as it is claimed that the international competitiveness of domestic firms 
is reduced. However, in contrast to this cost biased argument Michael Porter formulated 
the hypothesis that environmental policies could also serve as a vehicle to enhance the 
competitiveness. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate this conjecture in the context of a formal 
economic model under imperfect competition, in which firms undertake product 
differentiation and the government either regulates the environmentally harmful product 
properties or subsidizes the quality dependend production costs. Our analysis shows 
that there indeed situations exist, in which the policies can act as a credible lever for the 
domestic firms to change their behaviour and thus gain competitive advantages over 
foreign competitors.   
However, even with these results in mind the intention of our analysis is not a 
recommendation to formulate a „strategic environmental policy“. The needed 
informational requirements on the side of the government would be extraordinary high. 
Instead our aim is to show that environmental policies must not necessarily go along 
with a loss of domestic firms‘ competitiveness, but that they can help in attaining two 
things, a healthier environment together with a strengthened domestic firm sector.  
 
2. Environmental policy and international competitiveness  
Since the early eighties there has been a lively debate concerning the question whether 
environmental policies will tend to harm the competitiveness of domestic enterprises 
engaged in international trade. Following the argument that international trade is mainly 
determined by comparative cost advantages, environmental policies would worsen the 
competitive position since they often are accompanied by cost increasing compliance 
efforts.  
Porter (1991) was the first who claimed that such policies could actually be beneficial 
for the firms‘ performance despite the resulting extra costs. He argued that 
environmental regulation in one country could enhance the competitiveness of firms in 
this country even if – or rather, exactly if – it was more stringent than the regulation 
faced by competitors in other countries. Properly designed environmental policy 
measures could induce innovation within firms which would otherwise not be 
undertaken. The realization of these innovation opportunities would create net savings 
for these firms which he referred to as “innovation offsets”. This claim became 
subsequently known as the “Porter hypothesis”. 
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From a theoretical point of view, the Porter hypothesis is not straightforward. Its 
validity has been questioned in several lines.1 Among others, Palmer, Oates and Portney 
(1995) criticize Porter for implicitly assuming that the private sector systematically 
overlooks profitable opportunities for innovations.  
Yet under a theoretical setting that incorporates market imperfections the conclusion 
that environmental regulation may indeed raise domestic firms’ competitiveness in the 
world market can be derived. Recent contributions, which can best be summarized 
under the heading of “strategic environmental policy”, allow for imperfect competitive 
markets with strategic behavior on behalf of the agents. Under certain circumstances – 
depending e.g. on the nature of the behavior of the firms, the market structure, the 
number of market participants or the composition of the capital stock – strict 
environmental standards (where strict means that the marginal costs of abatement 
exceeds the marginal environmental damage) will shift profits from foreign to domestic 
enterprises.2 For instance, this will occur under an international duopoly setting, when 
enterprises compete in a Cournot fashion. The result can be obtained if asymmetric 
industry structures (Barrett 1994), innovative activities (Simpson and Bradford 1996, 
Stähler 1998), differentiated products and consumer preferences (Farzin 1996) or an X-
inefficient management (Klein and Rothfels 1999) are introduced. Under these settings 
strong environmental regulation can raise the competitiveness of domestic firms.3  
As the above discussion shows a great part of the theoretical work on the validity of the 
Porter Hypothesis focuses on the regulation of production processes of firms acting in 
Cournot competition and producing homogenous products. However, in many product 
markets product differentiation prevails. This enables the government to use standards 
for environmental product qualities as policy instruments. Examples for product 
standards are the prohibition of CFC as a propellent gas or the use of catalysts in motor 
vehicles. These regulations alter the product qualities in the sense that the products 
become environmentally friendlier. A suitable framework for the analysis of the impact 
of environmental regulation on firm behaviour is then to assume Bertrand competition.  
Analyses of the impact of environmental policy instruments assuming Bertrand 
competition do exist, but they are less frequent. Motta und Thisse (1993) have shown 
that in the case of symmetric firms in the countries concerned environmental product 
standards can result in larger domestic profits and welfare. Strict emission standards 
will raise marginal costs of domestic firms and hence the price of the commodity. In 
response, foreign firms raise their prices as well, which results in higher demand for the 
domestically produced good and in higher profits for domestic firms.4 However, in a 
different theoretical setting we can get different results. Rauscher (1997) shows e.g. for 
                                                 
1  See e.g. Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995), Simpson/Bradford (1996), Ulph (1997). 
2  See e.g. Barrett (1994), Rauscher (1997), Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1998), and Schmutzler (1998). 
3  For a survey of the literature see Rothfels (2000). 
4  No clear cut results can be achieved when the assumptions on the firms’ profit functions are relaxed. 
See Rauscher (1997). 
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the case of monopolistic competition with market entry, that environmental policies can 
be without any effect at all.  
However, the impact of product standards has so far only been analysed for symmetric, 
i.e. identical cost structures of domestic and foreign competitors. But in the real world 
cost asymmetries exist, firms that compete on a product market will typically have 
different structures of operating and/or fixed costs. Of course, technological imitation 
and diffusion will tend to neutralize large differences in the technological production 
possibilities. But factor costs typically differ between different states and therefore 
production costs differ, too. By taking these asymmetries into account, this paper 
contributes to the ongoing research debate of the impact of environmental policies. 
Our model goes beyond existing analyses in several respects: First, we investigate a cost 
advantage as well as a cost disadvantage of the domestic firm. Second, not only do we 
analyse the impact of an environmental product standard, but also of a subsidy which in 
reality is a quite common environmental policy instrument. Additionally, we introduce 
the concept of a “self-financing” subsidy which turns out to be helpful in the following 
welfare analyses. 
3. The model 
3.1  The basic structure 
In order to analyse the impact of environmental policy we slightly vary a standard 
model of vertical product differentiation and endogenous product qualities.5 The basic 
structure of the model is as follows: The demand side consists of a continuum of 
consumers indexed by θ ,  [ θ θ , 0 ∈ ] . θ  can be seen as an income parameter which is 
uniformly distributed with density one. One consumer buys at most one unit of the good 
that is supplied in the home country. Consumption of this good causes environmental 
harm. The higher the product quality ω , the lower is the environmental damage 
resulting from the consumption. Should the consumer refrain from purchasing the good 
his or her utility is zero. If a consumer θ  purchases it at price p he or she experiences the 
utility 
p u − =θ ω θ .        ( 1 )  
Therefore, θ  measures the consumer’s willingness to pay for environmentally higher 
quality. 
Two firms, one domestic and one foreign, operate on the output market by setting 
prices. Both firms face production costs that are increasing and quadratic functions of 
the produced product quality. Total quality dependend costs cj depend on the quality 
chosen and a cost parameter bj  
2 ω j j b c =        ( 2 )  
                                                 
5  See e.g. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982). For an application of the 
standard model to environmental policy see Motta and Thisse (1993). Herguera and Lutz (1996) use a 
similar model to analyse minimum quality standards as means of strategic trade policy.  
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with j = d, f for the domestic and the foreign firm, respectively. These costs are fixed 
for a certain production level and can e.g. be understood as R&D expenses that are 
necessary to develop a certain environmentally relevant quality. Quantity dependend 
costs are equal for both firms and have constant marginal costs. This allows us to 
neglect them as well as transportation costs in the following.  
Competition between the domestic and the foreign firm is modeled as a two-stage game. 
In the first stage, firms choose simultaneously the environmental qualities to be 
produced. In the second stage, they simultaneously determine the prices of the product. 
The solution concept used is that of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. As usual, the 
game is solved by backward induction. To get a benchmark case we first solve this 
model for the unregulated case, the market equilibrium. Later on, the framework allows 
us to analyse the impact of a minimum environmental standard on prices and produced 
qualities.  
 
3.2  Price competition  
Since consumers differ in their willingness to pay (according to their θ ) they will 
demand different environmental qualities. Thus it is optimal for the firms to produce 
different qualities. By assumption they can decide between a relatively low product 
quality ω l and higher quality ω h, whereby one firm can only produce one quality. The 
quantities demanded of each quality can be derived from equation (1). Setting u  
and solving for θ
h l u =
h we derive the income parameter of the consumer who is indifferent 


















 for the consumer indifferent between the low quality and not consuming at all 
and  l h θ θ − =  for the low quality demand. Consumers with θ  < θ l do not buy any 
product at all.  
This allows us to derive the profit functions of the high quality and the low quality 
supplier:  
2
h j h h h h h h b ) ( p c q p ω θ θ π − − = − =       
and  
2
l j l h l l l l l b ) ( p c q p ω θ θ π − − = − = . 
Since each firm can potentially produce the low or the high quality, the total profit 
function of the domestic firm consists of two segments, depending on the quality 
produced:6  
                                                 
6  See Appendix for a more detailed derivation of the profit function. 
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   (3) 
Graphically, the segmentation yields a kinked profit function (see Figure 1).  
 




In equilibrium, the firms do not supply identical qualities because then they would end 
up with a loss equal to the fixed quality dependend costs (compare the point ω f = ω d in 
Figure 1). Therefore, it is optimal to supply different qualities. This product 
differentiation relaxes price competition between the firms and allows them to earn 
positive profits. Under these circumstances the supplier of the higher quality earns a 
larger profit than his competitor. 
 
3.3 Quality  competition 
To derive the qualities supplied by the firms we have to investigate the profit function 
(3) in greater detail. The optimal response of a firm to a given competitor‘s quality is 
shown by its reaction function.7 Due to the segmented profit function the reaction 
function rd(ω f) is also segmented with a switching point  .   is the quality of the 
foreign supplier where the domestic firm is indifferent between supplying the high or 









f d l h ω π ω π ω ω = . 
In terms of Figure 1 this means that the two segments of the profit function have 
identical altitudes. As ω f increases the peak of the right segment falls while the other 
peak rises. If   the domestic firm produces a lower quality and vice versa.  
*





                                                 
7  See Appendix for the derivation of the reaction function.  
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Figure 2 shows the reaction function of the domestic supplier together with 
corresponding isoprofit curves. The reaction curve is positively sloped reflecting the 
fact that the qualities are strategic complements: Whenever the high quality supplier 
increases his quality, price competition is relaxed. From the viewpoint of the low 
quality supplier it is then optimal to increase his own too, as the rise of his returns 
exceeds the increase in production costs which increases his profits. Analogously, when 
the high quality supplier lowers the quality of the product, price competition intensifies. 
For the low quality supplier it is now sensible to reduce the quality of the product as 
well.  
The curves   and   represent those combinations of domestic and foreign qualities 
that result in a zero profit for the domestic firm as a supplier of either the high or the 
low quality, respectively.   and   represent quality combinations associated with 
positive profits. The arrows in Figure 2 thus indicate the directions of increasing profits 









Putting the reaction curves of the domestic and foreign firm together it is possible to 
derive the equilibrium qualities. Let us first assume that the firms are identical, i.e. their 
cost functions exhibit the same cost parameter b. In this case, two possible quality 
equilibria result, namely at the two points of intersection of the corresponding reaction 
curves, A and E (see Figure 3). Ex-ante the question which firm produces the high and 
which the low quality is indeterminate. The domestic firm can supply either the low 
quality (point A) or the high quality (point E). Both equilibria are subgame perfect, i.e. 
no firm has an incentive to deviate from the quality supplied in these equilibria. The 
supplier of the low quality product can not raise his profit by enhancing its product 
quality, since his own quality given an unchanged quality of the competitor would result 
in a lower profit.  
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Numerically the two equilibrium qualities can be found, depending on the cost 
parameters b and the maximal domestic income θ .8  
 










Now the properties of the market equilibrium are derived that serve as benchmark for 
the following analysis of the regulated equilibria.    
 
3.4  Market equilibrium and welfare 
Welfare is given by the sum of the domestic firm’s profit π d and the consumer surplus 
CS minus the environmental damage D that results from the consumption of the good in 
the home country: 
D CS W d d − + =π .       ( 4 )  
The profit function of the domestic firm is  
2 ω π d d b q p − = .       ( 5 )  
The consumer surplus results from the sum of the utilities of all those consumers who 
either buy the high quality good or the low quality good:  









d ) p ( d ) p ( CS l l h h .   (6) 
The extent of environmental damage depends on the quantities consumed in the home 
country, weighted with a factor that gives the damage resulting from the consumption of 
one product unit. We assume that the environmental damage declines inverse 
proportionally with the product quality.9  
                                                 
8 See  Appendix. 
9  Contrary to other analyses in this field of research, we take the environmental quality explicitely into 
account. This makes sense because environmental policy results in a quantity and a quality reaction 
and the impact on environmental quality is not ex-ante certain. However, the inclusion of 










+ =       ( 7 )  
This basic model as developed above allows us to analyse the impact of environmental 
policies on the domestic firm’s profit and the other welfare components also for the case 
that the firms exhibit different production costs. 
4.  Environmental regulation under cost advantage for the domestic 
firm 
4.1  The starting point 
We will now leave the symmetric world and assume that the domestic firm has a cost 
advantage in relation to its foreign competitor, i.e.   with a . Further, we 
assume that at the outset the domestic firm produces the low quality good, whereas the 
foreign firm supplies the high quality good. Thus we start from point A in Figure 3 but 
with the difference that the reaction curves are no longer symmetric. Due to the cost 
differences the reaction curve of the foreign supplier now is more to the left and the 
switching point   lies below the one of the symmetric case (see Figure 4).10 The 
difference between high and low quality supplied by the two competitors is the smaller, 
the larger the cost advantage of the low quality supplier is. Since A is a subgame perfect 
equilibrium despite the cost differences, the domestic firm can not credibly threaten to 
alter its quality. Under these circumstances the domestic government has a twofold 
incentive to enforce changes in the product quality supplied by the domestic firm: First, 
with increasing quality the firm’s profit increases, and, second, environmental quality 
can be enhanced.  
d f b a b = 1 >
*
d ω
The relevant question now is how the government can induce the domestic firm to alter 
the produced quality in order to increase its profit and to lower the environmental 
damage resulting from consumption. One possibilty to achieve this goal is to set the 
incentives in such a way that the domestic firm will produce a higher quality than its 
competitor. This sort of behaviour has been termend leapfrogging. The next section will 
take a closer look at the exact nature of the conditions that need to be fulfilled for 
leapfrogging to be possible. 
 
4.2  Imposition of a minimum quality standard 
One possible alternative lies in the imposition of a minimum quality standard ω min by 
the government. After the standard has been set both firms have to supply a product 
quality which is at least as high as the minimum standard. If the standard exceeds the 
                                                                                                                                               
environmental quality into the analysis is not a necessary condition for the derived positive welfare 
effects of the policy measures. 
10 With increasing cost difference the reaction curve moves further to the left up to the point where the 
point of intersection vanishes and A is not longer an equilibrium point. 
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formerly supplied low quality (i.e. if it is binding), the low-quality supplier must either 
enhance the produced quality or leave the market.  
 
Proposition 1: If the domestic firm enjoys a cost advantage over the foreign competitor 
and produces the lower product quality, the imposition of a binding minimum quality 
standard can induce the domestic firm to carry out a quality jump (i.e., to leapfrog). 
This results in higher profits of the domestic firm and the exit of the foreign firm from 
the domestic market. 
Proposition 1 can be proven graphically.11 For leapfrogging to be a credible strategy, 
the standard has to meet certain conditions. First, the profit of the domestic firm after 
the quality change should not be lower than in the previous market eqilibrium. This 
condition is critical even if the competitor does not react to the quality jump and persists 
in producing the same quality as before. This situation is represented in Figure 4 by 
point N. The minimum standard ω min is given by the intersection of the reaction curve of 
the foreign firm and the domestic firm’s isoprofit curve for zero profits. Therefore, with 
a minimum standard defined in this manner the domestic firm is indifferent between 
producing the low quailty (ω min) or change to a higher quality (point N). In both cases it 
would gain zero profits.  
 
Figure 4: Reaction functions with cost advantage for the domestic firm and minimum 















However, in point N the produced qualities are quite similar and price competition will 
be strong. Since the domestic firm is able to gain positive profits if it produces a 
different quality than the one given by point N, N is not a stable equilibrium. It turns out 
that the best alternative for the domestic firm is to leapfrog the competitor and to 
  11
                                                 
11 See the Appendix for an analytical outline of the proof and for the results of simulations.  
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produce the monopolistic quality ω M. ω M can be derived by maximizing the upper part 




ω = .        ( 8 )  
The sufficient condition for leapfrogging is that the cost advantage of the domestic firm 
has to exceed a certain threshold a* (see Figure 5).12 Should the cost advantage be less 
than  a* it will still be feasible for the domestic firm to produce a higher quality. 
However, this quality will not exceed the quality formerly supplied by the foreign firm 
f h ω , and no leapfrogging will occur. The larger the cost advantage, the less is the 
former quality differential making it easier for the domestic firm to leapfrog.  
 





Additionally, under the given assumptions the foreign firm has to exit the market. This 
is easy to verify with the help of Figure 4: The optimal response of the foreign firm to 
the monopolistic quality of the domestic firm (given by a point on its reaction curve) is 
a quality lower than ω min and therefore not allowed in the home country. Furthermore, 
as a producer of ω min the foreign firm would incurr a loss, because ω min was chosen in a 
way that the comestic firm earns zero profit. Thus it is not possible for the foreign firm 
with higher production costs than the domestic firm to profitably produce ω min. The 
result is that the foreign firm can not further supply the product in the home country. 
 
4.3 Welfare  effects 
Proposition 2: Assuming that the domestic firm has a cost advantage over its foreign 
competitor and produces the lower product quality in the market equilibrium, the 
imposition of a minimum standard can enhance environmental quality and welfare.  
The imposition of a quality standard affects the seperate components of the welfare 
function (4) in different ways. As seen in the previous analysis the profits of the 
  12
                                                 
12 Compare Table 1 in the Appendix.  
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domestic firm increase as it now has a monopolistic position on the output market.13 
Also, the environmental quality is enhanced since the consumed quality after the 
imposition is higher than before. However, this quality effect is accompanied by a price 
effect that reduces the consumed quantity. The welfare in former market equilibrium is 
determined by equations (3) with ω d = ω l, (6) and (7) and takes the form:  
2
2
2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2
4 2
2 7 4 2 4 2 7
l d
l h l




) ( W ω
ω ω ω
ω ω ω ω θ ω ω θ ω ω θ ω ω θ
ω −
−
− + − + −
= . 
Welfare in the new monopolistic case is given by 
M
M d M M b W
ω
θ




2 2 − − = . 














− = . 
It can be shown that under the assumption of a cost advantage for the domestic firm 
which renders leapfrogging possible, the inequality W ) ( W ) ( l M ω ω >  holds, i.e. the 
loss in consumer surplus is more than outweighted by the rise of environmental quality 
and of the firm’s profit.14  
Things are different when the domestic firm has a cost disadvantage instead of an 
advantage. Then a minimum quality standard does not induce leapfogging. However, 
we will show in the next section that even in the case of a cost disadvantage, 
environmental policies do not necessarily harm the competitiveness of the domestic 
firm. Critical in this respect is the use of a suitable chosen policy instrument.  
5  Environmental policy under a cost disadvantage for the domestic 
firm 
5.1  The starting point 
Similar to the previous scenario we assume that the domestic firm supplies the low 
quality product. Additionally we alter the situation of the home country by assuming 
that the domestic firm exhibits now a cost disadvantage compared to its competitor, i.e. 
 with  . Basically this means that we are again able to start the analysis 
in point A, but that the reaction curve r
f d b a b ′ = 1 > ′ a
d now lies below the one of the symmetric case 
(see Figure 6).  
                                                 
13 Here we abstract from market entry of other firms. 
14 This is shown in the Appendix. We show the existence of the equilibrium with the claimed properties 
locally (for one point in the parameter space). The validity for other parameter values results 
implicitely from the fact that the equilibrium results depend continually of the exogeneous variables 
and that, therefore, the results in the surrounding area of the assumed constellation correspond to the 
results of the assumed constellation. 
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5.2  Subsidizing quality dependend costs 
In what follows we analyse the impact of an environmental subsidy on the quality 
decision of the firm.15 To induce the firm to produce an environmental friendlier 
quality, the government offers the domestic firm a subsidy σ , i.e. a proportional 
reduction of the costs of providing quality with  ( 1 0, ∈ ) σ . This implies a different cost 
parameter b , and the domestic firm’s costs (net of subsidies) are now   d ′
2 2 1 ω ω σ d d d b b ) ( c ′ = − = .      (9) 
The reaction curve of the subsidized firm lies above the one without subsidy, as because 
of the now lower quality dependend costs, the firm is able to produce a higher quality at 
any given quality of its competitor. We show now that a subsidy exists which (a) 
induces the domestic firm to leapfrog and (b) is self-financing. The self-financing 
property means that the increase in profits going along with leapfrogging is at least as 
high as the subsidy expenditures of the government. A benefit of focussing on self-
financing subsidies is that the two „monetary“ terms of the welfare function, i.e. the 
profits and the subsidy, can easily be balanced against each other.  
 
Proposition 3: The subsidization of quality dependend costs can induce leapfrogging 
and result in a larger profit of the domestic firm even if the domestic firm has a cost 
disadvantage compared to the foreign supplier. 
Again, we illustrate the analytics graphically. To induce leapfrogging, the subsidy must 
result in indifference on behalf of the domestic firm between producing the low or the 
high quality for a given quality of its competitor. This condition is always fulfilled at 
the switching point of the reaction curve. Therefore, the subsidy has to be at least as 
high as to ensure that the reaction curve of the domestic firm is shifted upwards to the 
position shown in Figure 6: There it just touches the foreign firm’s reaction curve, and 
the quality supplied by the foreign firm  h ω ′  coincides with the switching point of the 
domestic firm. This level of subsidy is called σ min. As a consequence point A represents 
no longer a stable equilibrium. The domestic firm can now credibly leapfrog its 









                                                 
15 The possibility of leapfrogging under subsidization is also analysed by Herguera and Lutz (1997), but 
only for the case of symmetric costs. 















h ω ~ ' A
 
If the competitor does not react to the leapfrogging activities of the domestic firm 
situation   would result where the quality differences are relatively small. In a 
situation like this the foreign firm could increase its profits with larger differences in the 
quality. Thus   can not be a stable equilibrium and the game ultimately ends at point 
E with the foreign firm supplying the low quality. 
A′
A′
It remains to be shown that this subsidy can be self-financing. The larger the cost 
disadvantage, the higher the necessary subsidy will be to induce leapfrogging of the 
domestic firm. However, since rising subsidies imply increasing expenses of the 
goverment, we expect that a maximal cost disadvantage   exists. If this threshold is 
crossed, the subsidy will not be self-financing.  
max a′
 
Proposition 4:  Subsidizing the quality dependend costs can both enhance 
environmental quality and raise welfare, even if the domestic firm suffers from a cost 
disadvantage compared to the foreign supplier. 
The welfare function now takes the form 
D CS G W i i d − + − =π ω ) ( ,       ( 1 0 )  
with G      ( 1 1 )  
2 2
i f i d b a b ω σ ω σ ′ = =
for the government expenditures necessary for the subsidy and i = l, h for the produced 
low and high quality, respectively. The term (π i – G) reacts positively to environmental 
policy should it induce leapfrogging and if the subsidy is self-financing. A necessary 
condition for this to occur is the cost disadvantage does not rise beyond a certain point. 
This can be seen in Figure 7. At the point of the lowest leapfrogging inducing subsidy 
σ min, the profit jumps upwards. This profit increase exceeds than the total subsidy 
expenditures  G, since the profit of the high quality supplier always surpasses the 
  15 
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possible profits of the low quality supplier and furthermore the subsidy reduces the 
production costs.16  
 
Figure 7: Subsidy expenditures and profit increase  





With further increasing subsidy rates σ , the subsidy expenditures G rise more strongly 
than the profit of the domestic firm. This ensures the existence of a maximal self-
financing subsidy σ max where the increase in profits equals the amount spent by the 
government on subsidization.  
The size of the interval [] max min,σ σ  depends on the cost disadvantage: The higher  , 
the larger must be the subsidy σ
a′
min in order to induce leapfrogging and thus the lower 
will be the self-financable subsidy rate. It is possible to derive a maximum cost 
disadvantage   such that for larger a  no self-financing subsidy exists.  max a′ ′
Regarding the third term of the welfare function, the consumer surplus, subsidization of 
the domestic firm results in a positive quality effect but also a negative quantity effect. 
The positive quality effects is due to the fact that both qualities are higher than in the 
previous market equilibrium: The foreign firm faces lower costs and will therefore as 
the low-quality supplier produce a higher quality than the domestic firm has done 
before regulation. And the quality supplied by the domestic firm after regulation is 
higher than the one offered before by the foreign competitor, as well. A counterveiling 
influence is present through the negative effect on the supplied quantity. Increasing 
qualities go hand in hand with lower quantities actually consumed. It can be shown that 
under reasonable assumptions the positive quality effect will outweight the negative 
quantity effect. The rising qualities also exert a positive influence on the environmental 
quality, which is the fourth term in the welfare function.  
To sum up, should the cost disadvantage of the domestic firm not exceed  , then a 
subsidy in the range [
max a′
] max min,σ σ  can increase both the domestic firm’s profits and the 
environmental quality. Additionally, the subsidy can also serve to increase welfare.  
  16
                                                 




This paper studied the influence of environmental policies on environmental quality, 
domestic firms, and welfare. In using a partial-equilibrium model of vertical product 
differentiation where the consumption of a product causes environmental harm, the 
domestic industry will either be market leader or lag behind in terms of the 
environmental quality of the produced product. Assuming that the domestic industry 
lags behind in the benchmark case, we analysed the possibilities of the government to 
induce leapfrogging of the domestic firm.  
It was shown that in the case of a cost advantage for the domestic firm the imposition of 
a binding minimum quality standard can serve as a tool to induce leapfrogging. In case 
of a cost disadvantage for the domestic firm the same result can be achieved through 
adequate subsidization of the quality dependend production costs. In both scenarios the 
domestic firm can better its competitive position against foreign competitors and earn 
larger profits after regulation. Additionally, environmental quality and welfare can be 
enhanced.  
Thus we have shown that environmental policies must not necessarily harm the 
international competitiveness of domestic industries, an often heard claim voiced by the 
opponents of the Porter hypothesis. However, we explicitely do not recommend the 
adoption of a ”strategic environmental policy“ since the informational requirements are 
too high for governments to be able to carry out this demanding task.     




Derivation of the profit function (3) 
Maximizing of the profit function of the supplier for the high quality and the low 
quality,  
2
h j h h h h h h b ) ( p c q p ω θ θ π − − = − =       
and  
2
l j l h l l l l l b ) ( p c q p ω θ θ π − − = − = , 


































































Inserting these results in the original profit function we obtain equation (3). 
 
Derivation of the reaction functions 
The reaction function of the domestic firm is determined by the first order conditions 
















































These conditions implicitely define the reaction function rd(ω f). The slope of the 
reaction function is given by the implicit derivation of the first order condition for 
profits maximization: 
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in the segment for the low quality. The slope is in both cases positive which reflects the 
fact that the qualities act as strategic complements to each other. 
Combining the reaction curves of both competitors allows us to calculate the 
equilibrium qualities. The other parameter values can also be derived, depending on the 
cost parameter b and the maximal income parameter θ . This was done using 
Mathematica for the symmetric case bd = bf  and also for the cases of a cost advantage 
or a cost disadvantage for the home country (see Table 1). 
 
Analytical outline of Proposition 1: 
First, the leapfrogging inducing minimum quality standard has to be derived. For this 
we assume that the domestic firm can not make positive profits as a supplier of the low 
quality product ( 0 = d l π ), and that the foreign firm as a supplier of the high quality 





). However, this results in a very 
low quality differential and it is therefore advantageous for the domestic firm to switch 
to a higher quality ω M. Point E in Figure 4 is the only possible new equilibrium. To see 
this, we can check other quality combinations:  
Suppose the foreign firm would supply a quality higher than ω M. Then the conditions  




ω =  and    d f b a b =
would have to be fulfilled. However, this can only happen if  3 2 ≤ a  which contradicts 
the assumption of a cost advantage for the domestic firm (a > 1). 
Suppose alternatively that the foreign firm profitably supplies the low quality and the 
domestic firm the high quality. Then the conditions  




ω =  and b   d f b a =
would have to be met. This allows us to derive the quality ω l as a decreasing function of 
the cost parameter bf. For a > 1 we always have  l min ω ω > . Therefore, the foreign firm 
can not make positive profits as supplier of the low quality. 
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Analytical outline of Proposition 3: 
The minimal subsidy   can be derived with the following considerations:   min a′
The leapfrogging inducing subsidy has to lead to a cost parameter  a ) ( a min min ′ − = ′ σ 1,  
like point A in Figure 6, where the domestic firm produces  l ω ′  and the foreign firm 
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between supplying the high and the low quality has to be met. The term on the left hand 
side represents the profit of the domestic firm in point A‘ in Figure 6, whereas the right 
hand side shows its profit in point A. In this constellation,  h
~ ω  is the best answer of the 
domestic firm to the quality of its competitor. The first order condition for profit 
maximization with  h
~ ω  as the high quality and  l ω ′  as the low quality yields  
h f min
h h
h h h h h ~ b a
) ~ (
) ~ ~ ( ~
ω
ω ω
ω ω ω ω ω θ
′ =
′ −
′ + ′ −
2
4




Putting these conditions together we can derive the cost parameter   and since  min a′





− =1 σ . 
The maximal self-financing subsidy can be derived with help of the condition  
) b a ( ] b a ) [( b f d f max d h f max ′ − ′ − = π σ π ω σ 1
2 , 
i.e. the expenses for the subsidy have to equal the increase in profits resulting from 
leapfrogging. ω h is determined by the first order conditions for profit maximization of 
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With these conditions, the intervall [] max min,σ σ  can be derived, depending on  .   a′
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where  h ω ′′  and  n ω ′′  are the qualities supplied in point A. They are again determined by 
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. 
ω h and ω l are again given by  

















2 3 4 4
2 2
. 
These conditions together yield  . With a cost disadvantage larger than 14 % 
of the competitor’s costs a subsidy can no longer be self-financing.  
14 1, amax = ′
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Table 1: Results for model parameters and of simulations*  
Symmetric cost structures  Cost advantage for the domestic firm 
Parameter 
  Market equilibrium (A)  Regulated equilibrium (E) 
a  1 1,5  1,5 
a*  1,014 1,014 1,014 
qh  0,524994 θ  0,533329θ  0,5θ  
qn  0,262497 θ  0,266665θ   0 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Cost disadvantage  
for the domestic firm  Parameter 
Market equilibrium (A)  Regulated Equilibrium (E)  Regulated Equilibrium (E) 
a'  1,1 1,1 1,1 
max a′   1,143 1,143 1,143 
σ   -  σ min 0,446 
qh  0,523219θ  0,517169θ  0,51672θ  
qn  0,261609θ  0,258585θ  0,25836θ  














































σ min  0,428024 0,428024 0,428024 
σ max  0,451537 -  - 









































































*While the choice of the assumed degrees of asymmetry (a = 1,5 and  = 1,1) was carried out in an ad-
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